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Historical Attitudes Toward Suicide*
Daniel M. Crone**
Although suicide is an issue that has concerned all cultures1 ,
the attitude of ancient primitive societies toward suicide is a
matter of controversy. Most of the ancient societies seemed to
regard suicide with a horror that was often associated with fear
of the evil spirits that suicide was believed to set loose.2 At least
some ancient and primitive cultures, however, tolerated or
encouraged "altruistic suicide."3 In ancient China and India, for
example, the "suttee," a tradition in which a widow leapt onto the
burning pyre of her deceased husband, was widely practiced.4 It
is clear, however, that the roots of the Western Tradition, in
which the American constitutional order is firmly embedded,
spring primarily from ancient Judaic, Greek, and Roman
cultures.
I. ANCIENT JUDAIC CULTURE
There is no Old Testament passage which can be clearly
understood as offering explicit judgment on the ancient Judaic
view on the morality of suicide. 5 Indeed, the Old Testament con-
tains no expression in Aramaic, Hebrew or Greek that is
* Excerpt from Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24
DUQ. L. REv. 1, 17-50, revised by Daniel Crone.
** Professor of Philosophy, St. Joseph Seminary, Loyola University, Chicago, II;
Ph.D. Loyola University, 1995.
1. Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57, 59 (1982).
2. R. FEDDEN, SUICIDE: A SocIAL AND HIsToRIcAL STUDY 27-48 (1938). Some
anthropologists who have studied contemporary "primitive" cultures have found that sui-
cide meets with general condemnation among them. La Fontaine, Anthropology, in A
HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE 77-91 (A. Perlin ed. 1975). Other anthropologists
document instances of traditionally sanctioned suicides that expiate an impropriety or
protest an affront to honor. B. MALiNOwsiI, CRIE AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 78,
94-98 (4th ed. 1947).
3. Id. at 78-79.
4. Farberow, Cultural History of Suicide, SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 1, 3-4
(N. Farberow ed. 1975).
5. N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE 58 (1964).
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equivalent to the English term "suicide" as a distinct cause of
death.
The Old Testament, including the Apocrypha, lists only eight
cases that might be considered as instances of suicide; the Penta-
teuch7 contains none. In the Old Testament, the eight suicide
cases are as follows: (1) Abimelech committed suicide to escape
the disgrace of being slain by a woman;" (2) Samson destroyed
the Philistines and himself by pulling down a Philistine temple;9
(3) Saul, when all hope of victory was lost, died by falling on his
sword;10 (4) Ahithophel hanged himself when his counsel was
refused;'1 (5) Zimri burned himself in the royal citadel, appar-
ently as a self-imposed judgment for his sins;1 2 (6) Hannah, the
mother of seven sons who were tortured and martyred for refus-
ing to eat pork, threw herself on their funeral pyre;' 3 (7) Ptol-
emy, a Syrian official who lost respect because of his lenience
toward the Jews, poisoned himself; 4 and (8) Razis chose to com-
mit suicide rather than fall prey to his enemies.
15
With the exception of Samson, none of the eight individuals
who died by suicide in the Old Testament are presented as
heroes. Abimelech and Zimri are presented as evil rulers whose
conduct was displeasing to the God of Israel. Zimri is specifically
said to have "died in his sins . . . doing evil before the Lord."'
6
Saul and Ahithophel were both enemies of David, who would
become known as the greatest of Israel's kings. Saul, the Lord's
anointed king in his youth, died after turning away from God for
many years and slaying many innocent people in attempts to kill
David. Ahithophel committed suicide in the course of an unsuc-
cessful effort to betray and depose King David.
17
Only Samson's suicide is arguably heroic. The writer of the
Book of Judges notes of Samson, "[t]hose [Philistines] he killed at
his death were more than those he had killed during his life-
6. Daube, The Linguistics of Suicide, 1 PnI. & PUB. AFF. 387-437 (1972). Even in
English, the term "suicide", derived from the Latin suicidium, "to kill oneself," was not
used until 1651. Farberow, supra note 4, at 1.
7. The Pentateuch is the first five books of Jewish and Christian scriptures. WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 1988).
8. Judges 9:54.
9. Judges 16:30.
10. 1 Samuel 31:4.
11. 2 Samuel 17:23.
12. 1 Kings 16:18.
13. 2 Maccabees 7:1-42.
14. 2 Maccabees 10:113.
15. Id. at 14:41.
16. 1 Kings 16:18, 19.
17. 2 Samuel 17:19-23.
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time."18 As with the other Old Testament suicides, the nature of
Samson's suicidal act is neither praised nor condemned. Samson
was the only man among the eight who committed suicide, how-
ever, who was described as a man whose life was, on the whole,
pleasing to God. Samson's primary intent seems to have been
the destruction of the Philistines, the arch-enemies of his people.
Yet, Samson realized that in destroying the Philistines he would
also cause his own death, and Samson gained the strength to
commit the act after beseeching God. Since Samson did not
appear to directly will his own death, but only the death of the
Philistines at the cost of his own life, his intention was arguably
not even suicidal.
Razis, like Samson, is seen as a good man in the Old Testa-
ment. 9 Yet Razis' suicide, though dramatized, is hardly
glorified:
Now as the multitude sought to rush into his house as to break open
the door and to set fire to it, when he was ready to be taken, he struck
himself with his sword. Choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into
the hands of the wicked and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble
birth.
But whereas through haste he missed of giving himself a sure
wound, and the crowd was breaking in the doors, he ran boldly to the
wall and manfully threw himself down to the crowd. But they quickly
making room for his fall, he came upon a place where there was no
building and as he had yet breath in him, being inflamed in mind, he
arose and while his blood ran down with great stream and he was
grievously wounded, he ran through the crowd.
And standing upon a steep rock, when he was now almost without
blood, grasping his bowels with both hands, he cast them upon the
throng, calling upon the Lord of life and spirit to restore these to him
again. And so he departed this life.
20
According to the Old Testament, evidently the suicide assister
in the time of King David was not excused by the suicidal intent
of the deceased. For example, King David unhesitatingly orders
the death of a young man who claims to have killed Saul at
Saul's own request and with the belief that Saul was terminally
ill. The facts of the situation are reported as follows:
[The young man tells King David that King Saul said to him]: 'Stand
over me, and kill me. For anguish is come upon me, and as yet my
whole life is in me.' So standing over him, I killed him; for I knew that
he could not live after the fall ....
18. Judges 16:30.




And David said to him: Why did you not fear to put out your hand to
kill the Lord's anointed? And David, calling one of his servants, said:
"Go near and fall upon him."
And he struck him so that he died.
And David said to him: "Your blood be upon your own head. For your
own mouth has spoken against you saying: I have slain the Lord's
anointed."2
Some authors believe that suicide may have been a relatively
rare phenomenon in biblical times.22 It has been suggested that
a cultural prohibition toward suicide existed "because it repre-
sented a dangerous form of spilling blood, a loss of community
control over the blood of a tribal member, and the possibility of
an unattended corpse in the wilderness."23 Choron states that
"those who did commit suicide were considered deranged, and no
sanctions were taken against suicide."24 Nevertheless, according
to Farberow, "[w]hen the act did occur, the victim and his family
were punished by denial of a regular burial and the customary
rituals of mourning."25
The infrequency of suicide among the Hebrews, however, was
most probably due to their religious creed's positive emphasis on
the value of life and the special providence of God.26 Such a view
is exemplified by Job, who, in his fidelity to God, endured numer-
ous sufferings and spurned the bitter advice of his wife to "curse
God and die."27 As the influence of Hellenism spread, Jewish
writers developed a more philosophical posture and became more
explicit in their treatment of moral problems such as suicide.
The earliest known formal prohibition of suicide among the Jews
occurred in the first century A.D. when Josephus, after his army
had been conquered by the Romans, forbade his soldiers to kill
themselves on the grounds that suicide was a cowardly act con-
trary to nature and the law of God, who committed man's soul to
his body.28 Josephus' order contrasted with that of Eleazer Ben
Jair, who successfully urged his Zealot followers to commit mass
suicide at Masada in order to avoid capture by the Romans. 9
21. 2 Samuel 1:9, 10, 14-16.
22. See M.P. BArrNr, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 31 (1982).
23. Hankoff, Judaic Origins of the Suicide Prohibition, in SuIcIDE: THEORY AND
CLINICAL ASPECTS 6 (1979).
24. J. CHORON, SUICIDE 13-14 (1972). See also ST. JOHN-STEvAS, supra note 5, at
59.
25. Farberow, supra note 4, at 4.
26. ST. JomH-STEvAs, supra note 5, at 59.
27. See DARREL W. AMUNDSEN, MEDICINE, SOCIETY, AND FAITH IN THE ANCIENT AND
MEDIEVAL WORLDS 87-88, 90-92, 106, 114-15, 142 (1996); Job 2:9.
28. F. JOsEPHUS, Ti JEWISH WAR bk. 3, ch 8 (London 1851), relevant portions
reprinted in N. GLATZER, JERUSALEM AND ROME 283-90 (1960).
29. Farberow, supra note 4, at 4.
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After the Jewish exile, prohibitions of suicide were included in
the Rabbinic and Talmudic writings, and they were also
expressed in stories and in mourning and funeral sanctions. °
II. ANCIENT GREco-RoMAN CULTURE
Among the ancient Greeks, the earliest reference to suicide is
found in the poems of Homer. In Homer's writings, no attitude of
condemnation is expressed toward suicide and the suicides men-
tioned are of a heroic rather than melancholy nature.3 ' During
this "Heroic Age" of the Greeks, there appears to have been a
particular enthusiasm for life and suicide seems to have been a
exceptional event.3 2 While it was not considered an offense
against the law, both the cities of Thebes and Athens denied
funeral privileges to suicide victims, and it is likely that certain
religious sanctions were imposed on individuals who attempted
suicide.33
The only clear reference to suicide found among the Pre-
Socratic philosophers comes from Pythagoras of Samos (580-500
B.C.) through the writing of Plato. Influenced by the sages of
Egypt or India, Pythagoras adhered to the doctrine of transmi-
gration of souls. According to this belief, the immaterial soul is
imprisoned in the body where it undergoes expiation and purifi-
cation, and at death the soul enters another body to repeat the
cycle of life and death until it is wholly purified and thus set at
liberty to return to its divine source.34 Life in this world is a
period of trial and preparation, the conditions of which are
ordained by God. For Pythagoras, suicide constituted a violation
of this divine order and hence was judged immoral.35
According to Plato (429-348 B.C.), happiness is the supreme
aim in life, and the essential constituent of happiness is wisdom.
Wisdom unites one with the immutable and transcendent Forms,
and in particular, with the all-encompassing and preeminent
Form of the Good.3 s According to Plato, it is only upon death that
the soul, freed from corporeal existence, may aspire to the realm
"of the gods and of the Forms, where perfect happiness reigns. " "
30. BArTIN, supra note 22, at 32.
31. Mair, Suicide, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETmcs 26-27 (J. Hastings.
ed. 1922).
32. MASARYK, SUICIDE AND THE MEANING OF CIVIZATION 126-27 (1970).
33. Mair, supra note 31, at 29-30.
34. THoNNARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 18 (1955).
35. CHORON, supra note 24, at 108.
36. THONNARD, supra note 34, at 80-81.
37. Id. at 85.
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In the Phaedo, Plato's narrative of Socrates' last hours, suicide
is discussed in light of one's relationship both with oneself and
the gods.38 Socrates, who has been condemned to die by drinking
hemlock, recalls to his friends the view passed on from Pythago-
ras and through the Orphic Mysteries that "we mortals are in a
sort of prison, and that a man must not.., free himself from it,
or try to run away," and that "gods are our guardians and that
we men are one of the gods' possessions." 39 As the dialogue indi-
cates, however, a paradox arises because the philosopher longs
for death so that the soul may be set free from the body and
attain direct knowledge of the truth.4 ° Socrates is then asked by
his friends the following question: "How do you mean, Socrates,
that it is wrong to commit suicide, and yet that the philosopher
would gladly follow one who was dying?"
41
According to Socrates, to unravel this paradox it must be
understood that although the body is "a sort of prison," the soul
needs the body in order to transcend it and attain the vision of
truth. The process of dialectics (philosophy) that leads to this
vision begins with the data provided by the senses of the body.'
Thus, while corporeal existence is a troublesome burden to be
borne and managed,43 this life must be embraced insofar as it is
the means to spiritual liberation.
Socrates compares the human relationship with the gods to
that of slave and master: as the slave is the possession of the
master, all humans are the possession of the gods and do not
have the right to dispose of their lives." Accordingly, committing
suicide would provoke the anger of the gods and thus entail con-
sequent punishment.45 Even though the choice of death seems
preferable to life in some cases, suicide is not morally justified.46
Rather, as Socrates states, "one should refrain from bringing
one's life to an end until God sends some necessity, such as the
present one in my case."4"
In the time of Socrates, suicide was deemed immoral, not sim-
ply because it violated the "proprietary rights" of the gods, but
because it undermined the attainment of ultimate happiness.
38. R.W. BLUCK, PLATO'S PHAEDO *61c-63c (1955).
39. Id. at *62b.
40. Id. at *67c, 68a-b.
41. Id. at *61d.
42. See PLATo, REPUBLIC at *523; PLATo, TmAEus at *47a-c; D. NovAK, SUICME
ADMORALITY 11-15 (1975).
43. BLUCK, supra note 38, at *66b-e.
44. Id. at *62b-c.
45. Id. at *62c.
46. Id. at *62a.
47. Id. at *62c.
Vol. 35:7
Historical Attitudes Toward Suicide
Although it was through death that one may behold the Forms,
this could only be achieved through a life of virtue and wisdom;
the practice of philosophy. Only a life of "purification" could
qualify one for true happiness in the life hereafter, and thus Soc-
rates asserted:
So long as we are alive, it seems likely that we shall come nearest to
having knowledge if we do our utmost to have no contact or associa-
tion with the body except insofar as is absolutely necessary, and do
not infect ourselves with its nature, but purify ourselves of it, until
God Himself gives us the final release.
48
... It is not lawful to join the gods without having pursued philoso-
phy, without departing absolutely pure.
4 9
As much as the philosopher prepared for the attainment of the
Good, knowledge in this life was always obscured and imperfect.
Only the gods knew whether individuals were sufficiently pre-
pared to leave this life, because only the gods had perfect knowl-
edge of individuals.50
In the Laws ,51 Plato addresses the problem of suicide in the
context of an individual's relationship with the social order.
Plato's treatment of this matter within Laws can best be under-
stood in light of the ethics he developed in the Republic and
Timaeus.52 In these works, Plato stressed an organic interrela-
tionship between the individual person, the state and the uni-
verse; morality ultimately being a matter of the human soul's
disposition in the cosmic order of which the social order is an
important component.53 Plato's public policy on suicide stated in
the Laws presumed this ethical and cosmic perspective:
But what of him.., whose violence frustrates the decree of destiny by
self-slaughter though no sentence of the state has required this of
him, no stress of cruel and inevitable calamity driven him to the act,
and he has been involved in no desperate and intolerable disgrace, the
man who thus gives unrighteous sentence against himself from mere
poltroonery and unmanly cowardice[?] Well, in such a case, what fur-
48. BLucK, supra, note 38, at *67a.
49. Id. at *82b-c.
50. Id. at *62c. The "suicide" of Socrates is not evidence of an ancient belief in a
"right to suicide," rather the dialogue in the Phaedo supports the opposite conclusion.
The notion that Socrates believed suicide was ethical probably stems from application of
traditional definitions of suicide to Plato's work without an examination of Plato's own
explanation of Socrates' act. By some definitions, Socrates' death might be considered a
"suicide," albeit a coercive one, in that he does terminate his own existence by consuming
poison. To Socrates himself, however, the act was not a suicide, but an accession to his
execution order promulgated by the state.
51. PLATO, LAws *873c-e, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1432 (E. Hamilton &
H. Cairns eds. 1963).
52. See PLATO, TuMAEus *47b-c.
53. Id.
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ther rites must be observed, in the way of purifications and ceremo-
nies of burial, it is for heaven to say; the next of kin should consult the
official canonists as well as the laws on the subject, and act accord-
ingly to their direction. But the graves of such as perish thus must, in
the first place, be solitary; they must have no companions whatsoever
in the tomb. Furthermore, they must be buried ignominiously in
waste and nameless spots . . . and the tomb shall be marked by
neither headstone nor name.
54
Plato was concerned with suicide as a deliberate and reasoned
decision rather than the result of passion, compulsion or mad-
ness. In the latter case, culpability is lacking and the fault of
malice against society is not assumed; hence the state, while not
condoning such action, suspends its judgment. When suicide is a
rational and deliberate choice, however, it is deemed to be a fla-
grant act of contempt for the state and an abandonment of duty
to society and the divine order.
55
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) shared with Plato both the view that
society is necessary for the individual to attain happiness and
that the individual has a moral obligation to serve society:
The law does not allow a man to kill himself... when a man volunta-
rily - that is, knowing who the victim and what the instrument is -
injures another (not by way of retaliation) contrary to the law, he is
acting unjustly. But a man who cuts his throat in a fit of anger is
voluntarily doing, contrary to right principle, what the law does not
allow; therefore he is acting unjustly, but towards whom? Surely not
himself, but the state; because he suffers voluntarily, and nobody is
voluntarily treated unjustly. It is for this reason that the state
imposes a penalty, and a kind of dishonor is attached to a man who
has taken his own life, on the ground that he is guilty of an offence
against the state.
56
Aristotle refers again to suicide in a discussion concerning the
different virtues and vices. He begins by defining courageous
individuals as those who are fearless in the face of honorable
death, such as death in battle or any life threatening circum-
stances,57 but draws a distinction between this form of death and
another:
To kill oneself to escape from poverty or love or anything else that is
distressing is not courageous but rather the act of a coward, because it
shows weakness of character to run away from hardships, and the
suicide endures death not because it is a fine thing to do but in order
to escape from suffering.
58
54. PLATO, supra note 52, at *873c-e.
55. NovAx, supra note 42, at 20-21.
56. ARIsToTLE, ETmIcs *200-01 (J. Thompson trans. 1977).
57. Id. at 128-29.
58. Id. at 130.
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Aristotle postulated that individuals have an obligation to pur-
sue the good moral life and to realize their own nature according
to the principle of order and universal finality.59 Thus, Aristotle
deemed suicide as an act of cowardice and a rejection of one's
personal duty, both to society and to oneself.60
In the centuries following Aristotle, internal and external fac-
tors combined to alter the spirit of Greek life and thought. As
the City-States dissolved and Greece was subjected to foreign
rule, philosophy turned from metaphysical speculation toward
modes of thought such as Stoicism that emphasized individual
contentment in an otherwise troubled and unhappy world."
Founded by Zeno of Citium (336-264 B.C.), Stoicism later
became popular among the Roman nobility and has since found
followers in "every age, particularly since the Renaissance."6 2
Stoicism is essentially a philosophy of freedom as based on
rational choice. For the Stoic, the universe is governed by uni-
versal determinism; one seeks to live by reason in an effort to
know the very principle of universal order, otherwise known as
the Logos. It is not enough simply to know the Logos, however,
59. F. THoNNARD, supra note 34, at 124.
60. Since man, for Aristotle, is social by nature, Aristotle would not seek justifica-
tion for suicide under the aegis of "privacy" as many often do today. Rather, Aristotle's
understanding of the private (idios) involves non-public activities that cultivate virtue.
These virtue-promoting activities bear a telos which redounds upon an individual's public
life. ARISTOTLE, PoLrrCs 126b *22-23. "In Aristotle's account, privacy is not a right to do
as one pleases but an opportunity to do as one ought. In private one can cultivate virtues
one cannot in public, because the private offers activities the public cannot." JuDrrn A.
SWANSON, THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN ARISTOTLE'S POLITICAL PHILOsoPHY 207 (1992).
"The main task of laws, schools, and office holders in this respect is to help individuals
appreciate that their private conduct bears heavily on that [social] harmony and thereby
on the health of the political order." Id. at 209.
61. See MASARYK, supra note 32, at 129; THoNNARD, supra note 34, at 148-49.
The typical Sophist of the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ did not take the
health of the soul into his reckoning of success. But if man does not restore order
in his soul, Plato reasoned, then order cannot be restored in the state. Opposing
the Sophists, Plato offered the decadent Greek society - which had lost faith in its
religion, its traditions, its old customs - a means for making possible once more
the life of the soul and the life of civilization of Hellas.
RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 78 (1974).
It was the clever relativism of the Sophists [however], not the mystical insights of
Plato or Aristotle's aspiration after the Supreme Good, which dominated the classi-
cal Greeks in their decadence. The schools of philosophy lingered on long, until in
529 A.D. the Emperor Justinian shut them; but they had ceased long before to say
much that was relevant to enduring order.
Plato and Aristotle, nevertheless, would cross oceans in times to come.
The leading men of America's formative years would find Aristotle's concept of the
polity, in particular, still valuable to them.
Id. at 93.




as happiness lies in consciously and voluntarily acquiescing to
it. 63
For the Stoic, the inevitability of death is the ultimate chal-
lenge to liberty. This explains the Stoics' fascination with death
and the frequency with which they dealt with the subject of sui-
cide. Seneca, the Roman Stoic, wrote:
What is evil is to live in necessity; but there is no necessity to live in
necessity. Why no necessity? Because a path to freedom is open on
every side. The ways are countless, short and easy. Let us thank God
that no one can be forced to remain alive.
64
Also for the Stoic, virtue is a disposition of deliberate will with
regard to the fatal development of events. The Stoic strives to be
free of anything that would impede the will, never surrendering
freedom of the will to passion or compulsion. 65 Even if certain
death should confront the Stoic, imposing itself against an auton-
omous will to live, the Stoic must, as Seneca asserts, "make
death [one's] own in order to be free from it." 66 Thus, in Stoicism,
rational will, pure and simple, constitutes human dignity and
justifies, even glorifies, an act such as self-inflicted death.
One of the most celebrated examples of suicide among the Sto-
ics was that of Cato, who put himself to death for fear of dishonor
when his military hopes had been crushed by Caesar. Montaigne
said of Cato, "this was a man chosen by nature to show the
heights which can be attained by human steadfastness and con-
stancy... [s]uch courage is above philosophy."67
In contrast to the Stoics' acceptance of suicide and popular
admiration for individuals such as Cato, Roman law forbade sui-
cide and introduced a penalty for suicide which did not prove to
be a strong deterrent,68 but persisted in Western Civilization for
almost two millennia. The penalty was forfeiture of the suicide
victim's goods and estates, so that these could not pass to the
victim's heirs. 9
63. THoNNARD, supra note 34, at 148-50.
64. Seneca, Epist. ad Lucilium XII, reprinted in LANDSBERG, supra note 62, at 43.
65. THoNNAmw, supra note 34, at 48-49.
66. See Seneca, Epist. ad Lucilium, IXXII: Fac tui juris quod alieni est;" De Otis
VII, I: "Non sit ipsa mores otiosa.", reprinted in LANDSBERG, supra note 62, at 41-45.
67. LANDSBERG, supra note 62, at 68. Evidently, Montaigne's high regard for Cato
and the stoic view of life and death was not deeply embraced by the common Roman of
Cato's day. Russell Kirk noted: "[T]he Stoic philosophy, and the integrity of the Good
Emperors, could not regenerate the Roman masses. Stoicism was a high and austere
creed, too abstract and intellectual for popular acceptance. Even the imported Egyptian
cult of Isis had more votaries, in those days, than did Stoicism." KiRK, supra note 61, at
125.
68. CHORON, supra note 24, at 21.
69. Farberow, supra note 4, at 6.
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III. EARLY CHRIsTIAN CULTURE
The gradual dominance of Christianity in the Roman Empire
culminating in the conversion of the Emperor Constantine in the
4th century A.D. worked as a transformation in the cultural atti-
tude toward suicide. Imbuing all strata of the Roman world with
its spiritual principles, Christianity provided a view of life that
was itself inimical to suicide.70
The New Testament, like the Old, contains no explicit prohibi-
tion against suicide. The one suicide that the New Testament
describes is that of Judas Iscariot, who ignominiously hanged
himself after betraying Christ. Judas' act hardly recommended
suicide to the early Christian church. 71 The early Christians
incorporated Judaic attitudes and Platonist philosophy which
both opposed the practice. Indeed, the major church fathers rep-
resentative of the orthodox Christian community, including Cyp-
rian, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, John Chrysostom and Clement
of Alexandria, all rejected suicide.72 Nevertheless, certain schis-
matic and heretical sects arose which confused the distinction
between suicide and martyrdom. To dispel such confusion, St.
Augustine (354-430 A.D.), following in the tradition of his fore-
bears which proscribed suicide, made explicit the condemnation
of suicide when confronted with the heretical sects which
embraced the act and the Stoics, who reproached Christian
women for not killing themselves when violated at the hands of
barbarians.73
70. MAsARYK, supra note 32, at 155-57. As Russell Kirk stated: "In the long run,
the Christian faith which Saint Peter and Saint Paul had brought to Rome would renew
the moral order, even though it could not save the state. But Christianity was a revered
religion, the worship of a crucified God, and it would touch the heart." KInK, supra note
61, at 125.
71. See Matthew 26:24 (providing: "[W]oe to that man by whom the Son of man
shall be betrayed: it were better for him, if that man had not yet been born"); John 17:12
(stating: "Those whom thou gave me have I kept; and none of them is lost, but the son of
perdition). In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, the majority of judges stated
that "the suicide of Judas Iscariot is not treated as a further sin, rather as an act of
repentance." Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 808 n.25 (9th
Cir. 1996) en banc, cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110). No serious Christian scholar has suggested, however,
that Judas' suicide as described in Matthew's gospel connotes redemptive contrition
rather than sinful despair. See AMUNDSEN, supra note 27, at 104 for a discussion on
Judas' suicide.
72. AMUNDSEN, supra note 27, at 86-89 (Cyprian); 94 (Justin Martyr); 90, 95-96
(Tertullian); 92 (John Chrysostom); 78, 92, 118 (Clement of Alexandria).
73. LANDSBERO, supra note 62, at 77. See AMUNDSEN, supra note 27, at 72-73, 117-
20 for a discussion of St. Augustine's articulation of the common Christian condemnation
of suicide. Amundsen noted: "[B]y removing certain ambiguities, [Augustine] clarified
and provided a theologically cogent explanation of and justification for the position typi-
cally held by earlier and contemporary Christian sources." AMUNDSEN, supra note 27, at
102 (emphasis added).
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Augustine's view combined Greek, Roman and Oriental tradi-
tions of divine law, as transmitted through Cicero and Plotinus,
with the formulas of the Christian faith. Augustine's perspective
was theocentric: all existence, he believed, was created by and
wholly dependent upon God. As God embodied creative and uni-
tive love, it was the human purpose in mirroring the Divine life
to participate in the free and creative act of love by conferring
upon creation the highest possible degree of order and perfection
in accordance with the universal and invariant eternal law.
While God demanded the accomplishment of order and perfec-
tion, humans were free agents. Humans had moral obligations,
in their liberty, to conform themselves to the natural law which
was itself a product of God's will. Only in a human's free assent
and correspondence to this law lies the individual's true
happiness. 4
From this perspective of moral obligation toward the objective
Good (natural law), Augustine addressed the problem of self-
imposed death. In the City of God, Book I, Augustine examined
the issue of suicide from a variety of different motives and con-
demned the act as intrinsically sinful on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Sixth Commandment:
It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical
books there can be found either divine precept or permission to take
away our own life, whether for the sake of entering the enjoyment of
immortality, or of shunning, or ridding ourselves of anything whatso-
ever. Nay, the law, rightly interpreted, even prohibits suicide, where
it says, Thou shalt not kill.
75
Augustine recognized two exceptions to this Commandment.
The two exceptions are that the taking of a life is tolerated when
performed through the justice of the state (as in the case of war
and capital punishment), or by special intimation by God (as pre-
sumed to be the case with Abraham, Samson and a number of
other Saints).76 In any event, however, individuals do not have
the authority to take their own lives. 77 Augustine also discussed
the question of suicide committed through fear of punishment or
dishonor, noting: "[If] it is not lawful to take the law into our
own hands, and slay even a guilty person, whose death no public
sentence has warranted, then certainly he who kills himself is a
homicide ... 78
74. THONNARD, supra note 34, at 215, 230, 262.
75. W. GATEs, BAsIc WRrINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 27 (1948) (City of God I, XV).
76. Id. at 28, 32-33 (City of God I, XXI, XXVI).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 23 (City of God I, XVII).
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Responding to the case of a woman faced with the choice of
suicide or rape, Augustine asserted that virtue, which in this
case is chastity, is proper to the soul and is not lost through
external circumstances as when one is compelled by force to yield
to another:
[A] woman who has been violated by the sin of another, and without
any consent of her own has no cause to put herself to death; much less
has she cause to commit suicide in order to avoid such violation, for in
that case she commits certain homicide to prevent a crime which is
... not her own.
7 9
By the same principle, Augustine asserted that suicide can never
be permitted to avoid a possible evil; ° rather, he extolled the vir-
tue of fortitude, "which will rather endure all ills than consent to
evil."81 Augustine additionally maintained that suicide jeopar-
dizes salvation as no other mortal sin since it deprives the sui-
cidal individual of time needed for contrition.
8 2
Augustine also challenged the notion that suicide could ever be
an admirable deed:
[I]f you look at the matter more closely, you will scarcely call it great-
ness of soul, which prompts a man to kill himself rather than bear up
against some hardship of fortune, or sins in which he is not implicated
.... Again, it is said many have killed themselves to prevent an
enemy doing so. But we are not inquiring whether it has been done,
but whether it ought to have been done.83
In discussing the suicide of Cato, Augustine asked:
But of this notion of his, what can I say but that his own friends,
enlightened men as he, prudently dissuaded him, and therefore
judged his act to be that of a feeble rather than a strong spirit, and
dictated not by honorable feeling forestalling shame, but by weakness
shrinking from hardship?
84
As a true example of courage, Augustine offered the example of
Marcus Regulus, who submitted to captivity rather than killing
himself after facing defeat by the Carthaginians.8 5 Augustine
concluded that if such valiant warriors of earthly kingdoms and
false gods had no fear of death and would rather endure slavery
than commit suicide, then "how much rather must the Chris-
tians, the worshippers of the true God, the aspirants to a heav-
enly citizenship, shrink from this act."
86
79. Id. at 24 (City of God I, XVIII).
80. OATEs, supra note 75 at 31, 33 (City of God I, XXV, XXVII).
81. Id. at 23 (City of God I, XXVIII).
82. Id. at 31-32 (City of God I, XXV).
83. Id. at 28-29 (City of God I, XXII).
84. Id. at 29-30 (City of God I, XXIII).
85. OATEs, supra note 75, at 30 (City of God I, XXIV).
86. Id. at 31 (City of God I, XXIV).
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With Augustine's contribution, the Roman Catholic Church
articulated its stance against suicide; its condemnation consist-
ently expressed in canonical directives applied to civil life. The
Council of Arles (452 A.D.), for example, incorporated the Roman
law's forfeiture of a suicide victim's estate. The Council of Braga
(563 A.D.) banned religious rites for suicide victims. The
Antisidor Council (590 A.D.) provided penalties for suicide, and
the Synod of Nimes (1284 A.D.) denied suicide victims Christian
burial.8 7 Due to the Church's dominant cultural and ethical
influence in Europe, from the time of the late Roman Empire
through the period of the Renaissance and Reformation the
occurrence of suicide was negligible: "Deliberate suicide seems to
have ceased almost entirely with the establishment of Christian-
ity, and to have continued in abeyance until the reign of philo-
sophic skepticism ....
IV. THE MIDDLE AGES
The Christian world-view that has so greatly dominated West-
ern attitudes throughout the Middle Ages was further developed
and synthesized by the most eminent philosopher of this period,
St. Thomas Aquinas. Following in the tradition of Augustine,
Cicero, Aristotle and Plato, Aquinas grounded his moral and
legal philosophy on the natural law. Aquinas' treatment of sui-
cide is found in his Summa Theologica, II-II, question 64, article
5. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas stated that it is unlawful to
kill oneself for three reasons: (1) suicide is contrary to the natu-
ral inclination toward self-preservation and to charity whereby
everyone should love oneself; (2) since each person is a part of a
community, the killing of oneself involves injury to that commu-
nity; and (3) suicide is a violation of God's rights over man as
man's Creator. Like Augustine, Aquinas concluded that suicide
is always intrinsically sinful. 9
Aquinas maintained that the natural inclination toward self-
preservation is due to an existent's inherent nature, which is to
preserve its existence. Aquinas reasoned that it is virtue that
disposes a person to act in accordance with the principles of this
aspect of natural law.90 Through vice, one can alienate oneself
from the natural inclination, including the natural inclination to
preserve one's life, but Natural Law cannot itself be negated.91
87. Farberow, supra note 4, at 7.
88. J. O'DEA, SUICIDE: STUDIES ON ITS PHILOSOPHY 85 (1882).
89. See T. AQuINAs, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1470 (Dominican ed. 1947) (II-I1, 64.5)
90. 2 T. AQUNAs, THE BAsIc WRITINGS OF ST. TuoMAS AQUINAs (A. Pegis ed. 1945)
(SummA THEOLOGICA II-II, 123.12).
91. Id. at 647 (StUMMA THEOLOGICA II-I, 64.7).
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Thus, although one may err in one's perception of the natural
law, which may reduce subjective culpability, an erroneous
intent or action is always an objective wrong.
Arguing that suicide is also an offense against the state, Aqui-
nas stressed the moral obligation an individual has as a social
creature toward the individual's community. Aquinas also
rejected any utilitarian claim that suicide may be a service to
society if the suicidal individual is perceived as a social burden,
and argued instead that human sociality is grounded in charity
and transcends the exclusive consideration of utility:
92
Man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and
has; and so it does not follow that every act of his acquires merit or
demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can,
and has, must be referred to God; and therefore every act of man,
whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God
from the fact of the act itself.
93
Although it is true that the community must be served, this is
not an end unto itself. Society must not eclipse the human rela-
tionship with God by making any "existential demands" on its
members in the interest of social expediency:94
Since, then, the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief
Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must
be derived from the eternal law .... Therefore all laws, in so far as
they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law.
95
... Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of
law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if at any point it
departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion
of law.
96
Thus, the sociality of man imposes a moral prohibition against
self-imposed death; suicide can never be justified, whether it be
for personal or social considerations. It should be noted that the
utilitarian ethic of "the greatest good for the greatest number" is
subsumed and transformed within the Thomist outlook: The
greatest good is realized in the ultimate purpose of the Law, and
the greatest number includes the totality of existence.
Aquinas also condemned suicide on the ground that it is a vio-
lation of God's domain over human beings as their Creator.
Since human beings are not individually responsible for confer-
ring life upon themselves, the question of existence is not proper
92. AQuIAs, supra note 89, at 365 (I-II, 21.4 ad 3). Cf id. at 1035 (113.9 ad 2).
93. NovAy, supra note 42, at 67.
94. AQuiNAs, supra note 90, at 766 (I-I1, 93.3).
95. Id. at 784 (I-II, 95.2).
96. Id. at 1469 (II-II 64.5)
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to human jurisdiction. Thus, concluded Aquinas, individuals
have no right to intend their own death.97
The medieval view of suicide was expressed in dramatic form
by Dante. In the Inferno, Dante depicted individuals who have
committed suicide as trees that are continually tormented by
Harpies who feed on them. Flung over the tree branches are the
vacant skins of the bodies that the trees once inhabited; unlike
the other souls in Hell, the suicide victims do not have the use of
their earthly forms which they have wantonly thrown away.98
V. THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION
The firm and unanimous opposition to suicide that prevailed
for over ten centuries in the West weakened with the coming of
the Renaissance and Reformation. Such weakening, however,
was not brought about by the reformers. Martin Luther believed
suicide to be the work of the devil.9 9 John Calvin stated that "the
faithful should accustom themselves to such a contempt of the
present life, as may not generate either hatred of the present life,
or ingratitude towards God."' 10 While an individual may be
"obnoxious to sin," the individual may not hate life but be "pre-
pared to remain in it during the Divine pleasure ... [flor it is a
station in which the Lord has placed us, to be retained by us till
he call us away."1 1 Believers must "leave the limits of our life
and death to his decision."
10 2
Two works that questioned complete condemnation of suicide,
however, were published in the Seventeenth Century. In 1621,
the Anglican clergyman Robert Burton (1577-1640) published
such a work under a pseudonym, The Anatomy of Melancholy. 
0 3
This work explored at length the purported causes, symptoms
and cures of melancholy, and questioned the accepted position
that individuals who commit suicide are eternally damned. 1°4
Biathanatos'0 5 , authored by another Anglican clergyman, the
poet John Donne (1572-1631), was published in 1646. In this
work, Donne argued that actions are intrinsically neither good
97. Id.
98. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: INFERNO 166-75 (J. Sinclair trans.
1982) (canto XIII).
99. M. LUTHER, THE TABLE TALK OR FAzmIIAR DISCOURSES OF MARTIN LUTHER 315
(DLXXXV) (Phila. 1868).
100. J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 568 (bk. III, ch. IX, para. III)
(London 1838).
101. Id. at 569 (bf. III, ch. IX, para. IV).
102. Id.
103. Farberow, supra note 4, at 9.
104. See generally id.
105. J. DONNE, BiATHANATOS 36 (London 1700).
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nor evil; rather, the good or evil of an action depends entirely
upon God's command. 106 Since circumstances vary, each suicide
must be judged individually, and in some cases the suicide is jus-
tified and acceptable to God.
10 7
There were many Christians in England who were solidly
against suicide and opposed views such as the view held by Bur-
ton and Donne. Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), Archbishop of
Canterbury and the most influential man in shaping the Church
of England, said that self-murder was "cursed of God, and
damned forever." 08
In 1594, John King, who later became Bishop of London,
taught that Scripture expressly commanded against suicide. 10 9
King specifically approved the positions of Augustine and Aqui-
nas."1 0 Likewise, in 1600, George Abbot, later Archbishop of
Canterbury, cited the Sixth Commandment as forbidding sui-
cide."' John Sym, an Anglican clergyman with Puritan inclina-
tions, wrote Life's Preservative Against Self-Killing in 1637, in
which he claimed that self-murders were "certainly and infallibly
damned souls and body for evermore without redemption.
" 112
Sym's concern was with a contemporary increase in suicide and
he wrote recommendations for prevention of suicide as well." 3
Another Puritan, Sir William Denny, wrote a volume of poetry
against suicide in 1653 called Pelecanicidium: or the Christian
Advisor Against Self-Murder.114 This work was in response to
the 1646 publication of Biathanatos.15 Henry Hammond's popu-
lar Practical Catechism,"6 published in many editions from 1645
to 1700, re-emphasized the Anglican opposition to suicide, as did
Jeremy Taylor's two volume treatment of suicide in 1660 entitled
Doctor Dubitantium, or the Rule of Conscience. "I In 1655, at the
height of the suicide epidemic then in effect, Richard Capel
expanded the treatment of suicide in his previously published
book, Tentatious. 118 Capel presented the Puritan solution to sui-
106. Id.
107. Farberow, supra note 4, at 9.
108. S. SPROTT, THE ENGLISH DEBATE ON SUICIDE FROM DONNE TO HUME 13 (1961).
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id. at 42.
113. SPROTT, supra note 108, at 31.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id. at 41.
117. Id. at 40.
118. SPROrr, supra note 108, at 46.
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cide as an "intensified piety."11 9 John Bunyan, in Pilgrim's Pro-
gress (1678), had Hopeful advise Pilgrim that suicide was
forbidden when Giant Despair held the two individuals captive
in Doubting Castle.
20
Orthodox Christianity in England continued to oppose suicide
with the publication of Anglican Thomas Philopot's Self-Homi-
cide-Murther in 1674, 211 Ezra Pierce's A Discourse on Self-Mur-
ther122 in 1962, and Samuel Puffendorfs The Whole Duty of Man
According to the Law of Nature' in 1691. By 1705, clergymen
had ceased to mention Biathanatos in sermons on suicide. 1"
Although suicide still continued to increase, the arguments in
defense of suicide were becoming atheistic rather than deistic.1
21
In Italy, jurists held an inquiry into the reasonableness of sui-
cide laws during which Montaigne and Charron presented lim-
ited defenses of the practice. 26 The theologians of seventeenth
century France, however, severely condemned suicide. Such
theologians as Malebranche, Nicole, Arnaud, Descartes and La
Mothe le Vayer were joined in their suicide condemnation by
"theologians of every stripe, Jansenist, Jesuit and Protestant."
27
VI. THE "AGE OF REASON" AND BEYOND
During the eighteenth century, the controversy between oppo-
nents and defenders of suicide became more pronounced. Schol-
ars had become divided and isolated in rival positions on the
issue of suicide, and no unifying system of thought prevailed.' 28
Individualism and subjectivism inclined philosophers toward the
forces of nature and the resources of the thinking-self to explain
existence; 129 skepticism and religious indifference began to
spread throughout society.
119. Id. at 47. Interestingly, the suicide epidemic from 1640 to 1660, a period when
Puritans were in the ascendancy, may have been fostered by popular notions of Calvinist
theology. First, one who felt no sense of election was tempted to end his or her life before
further sin caused greater punishment in Hell. Second, an emphasis on direct, personal
revelations from God led some to feel fleeting impulses to suicide to be God's special direc-
tion, as with Samson in the Old Testament. Puritan writers later countered this by argu-
ing that direct revelation could not be contrary to revelation in Scripture. See generally
Farberow supra note 4, at ch. II.
120. SPRorr, supra note 108, at 52.
121. Id. at 68.
122. Id. at 69.
123. Id. at 84.
124. Id. at 92.
125. SPROTr, supra note 108, at 93.
126. Crocker, The Discussion of Suicide in the Eighteenth Century, 13 J. HIST. IDEAS
47, 52 (1952).
127. Id. at 50.
128. THONNARD, supra note 34 at 453-54.
129. Id. at 476-77.
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Among the apologists for suicide was John Robeck, a Swede,
who wrote a 1736 treatise defending suicide, and who thereafter
promptly killed himself1 30 Other defenders were Montesquieu,
Voltaire, Helvetius, Vauvenargues, D'Holbach, Condorcet, Char-
ron, Saint-Cyran and J.M. Merian.13' Other individuals con-
demned suicide from a religious point of view, whether from the
standpoint of conviction or caution, but held that suicide was jus-
tified from a purely human perspective. These individuals
included Bayle, D'Alembert and Maupetuis. 1 2 Yet, the individu-
als who espoused the traditional condemnation of suicide were, if
anything, more numerous and prolific. These individuals
included Spinoza, Moses Mendelsohn, Jean Jacques Rousseau,
Formey, Jean Dumas, John Adams, Charles Moore, Robinet, J.B.
Meriso, Deliste de Sales, Richard Hey, Holland, Bergier, Dupont
de Nemours, Chaudon, La Mettrie, Sabatier de Castres, d'Argens
and Turgot. 3 3 Mme. de Stael began as a supporter of suicide in
the eighteenth century, 34 but in the nineteenth century became
an ardent opponent to suicide.135 Perhaps the most illustrious
contestants in the two camps, however, were David Hume and
Immanuel Kant.
Faithful to the empiricism for which he is best known, Hume
(1711-1776) believed that it is impossible to found morality
either on God, because individuals are ignorant of God's exist-
ence, or on reason, because the proper domain of reason is merely
speculation.'36 The foundation of morality for Hume, then, lies in
a natural sentiment that distinguishes the good from the bad.
The good is that which is useful to sensible life, satisfies life's
aspirations, and is approved by others; the bad is either what is
opposed to sensible life or what society holds in disapproval.
Hume thus advocated a morality based on a natural inclination
toward general utility, 37 and his view on the question of suicide
conformed to this ethic:
If suicide be supposed a crime it is only cowardice can impel us toward
it. If it be no crime, both prudence and courage should engage us to
rid ourselves at once of existence when it becomes a burden. It is the
only way that we can be useful to society - by setting an example
which, if imitated, would preserve to everyone his chance for happi-
130. Crocker, supra note 126, at 54.
131. Id. at 63-65.
132. Id. at 50-59, 64-65.
133. Id. at 50-68.
134. Id. at 53, 60.
135. Crocker, supra note 126, at 55, 56, 58, 59.




ness in life and would effectually free him from all danger of
misery.
138
Hume further argued that no individual is obligated to society
if the obligation entails great suffering to the individual. If, by
living, there is no mutual benefit for both the individual and soci-
ety, there ceases to be any moral imperative for continuing the
individual's life. As Hume states:
All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something
reciprocal. I receive the benefits of society and therefore ought to pro-
mote its interests, but when I withdraw myself altogether, can I be
bound any longer?
139
Thus, when an individual removes himself or herself from society
by committing suicide, argues Hume, the individual can no
longer derive any benefit from the community and is no longer
obliged to provide any benefit in return.
With respect to the claim that suicide is a violation of natural
law, Hume replied that society interferes with the laws of nature
consistently, and does so as a matter of necessity:
[A]ll animals are entrusted to their own prudence and skill for their
conduct in the world and have full authority, as far as their power
extends, to alter all the operations of nature. Without the exercise of
this authority they could not subsist a moment; every action, every
motion of man, innovates on the order of some parts of matter and
diverts from their ordinary course the general laws of motion.
140
Hume thus claims that to commit suicide is to be as much a dis-
turbance to the laws of nature as postponing the suicidal individ-
ual's death by treating a disease or defending the individual
against an assailant:
If I turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the
course of nature, and I invade the peculiar province of the Almighty
by lengthening out my life beyond the period, which, by the general
laws of matter and motion, he had assigned it.
14 1
Hume argued that if interference with the laws of nature is
granted as permissible, then suicide cannot be held to be wrong
on the grounds of disturbing such laws. 42 If God is able to use
natural events to bring about an individual's death, Hume asked,
why can God not use suicide?143
To assume that the action of an individual is an encroachment
on Divine providence or a disturbance of the universal order was,
138. Hume, On Suicide, in BATr, supra note 22, at 95.
139. D. Hume, On Suicide, THE PmLosopmcAL WoRKs 566 (1826).
140. Id. at 561.
141. Id. at 562.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 563.
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to Hume, absurd in that such an assumption presupposed that
individuals have a special importance in the scheme of things.
Hume did not believe in the sanctity or significant importance of
human life: 'The life of a man is of no greater importance than
that of an oyster.""'
As opposed to philosophers such as Plato and Aquinas, who
based morality on an objective Good, and empiricists such as
Hume who based morality on sensual or material interest,
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) sought to ground morality in the
form of law that he believed was inherent in the moral subject.
Kant maintained that practical reason possesses an a priori
form, or "category" that parallels the categories of understand-
ing. The operation of this a priori category is rooted in the basic
structure of human nature that is common to all individuals.
Therefore, the category could be used to build a necessary and
universal morality. For Kant, the foundation of an individual's
morality depends upon the nature of the individual. 15 In Kant's
view, the moral law recognizes no "hypothetical imperative" in
the conscience, as, for example, when an individual considers
whether he or she "ought" to purchase one coat or another. Such
imperative is but an inclination based on caprice of sensibility.
True morality, rather, is distinguished by the "categorical imper-
ative" of pure obligation, wherein an action is performed solely
for the sake of duty. 1
46
In Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant
proposed three formulations of the categorical imperative for
determining the morality of any practical maxim. Briefly stated
these formulations are: 1) individuals should act in such a way
that their actions could serve as a universal law; 2) individuals
should always act so that they treat humanity, whether in their
own person or in that of another, as an end and never merely as
means; 3) individuals should act in such a way that the individu-
als' will could consider itself as making universal laws by its
maxims. 14  To illustrate his general moral principles, Kant
applied these formulations to the example of suicide:
A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of
life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask him-
self whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his
own life .... His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to
shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil
144. Humz, supra note 138, at 562.
145. THoNNARD, supra note 34, at 689-91.
146. Id. at 691.
147. I. KANT, FUNDAMFN'TAL PRiNCipLES oF THE METAPHYsIc OF MoRALs 39-40 (T.
Abbott trans. 1964).
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than satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle
founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we
see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to
destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to
impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore
could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possi-
bly exist as a universal law of nature ....
.. . He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his
action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself.
If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances,
he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition
up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, some-
thing which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions
be always considered as an end in himself.148
Kant also stated:
... To destroy the subject of morality in his own person is tantamount
to obliterating from the world, as far as he can, the very existence of
morality itself.
149
Nevertheless, Kant further asserted that the duty of self-preser-
vation is subordinate to yet a higher duty:
[Tihere is much in the world far more important than life. To observe
morality is far more important. It is better to sacrifice one's life than
one's morality. To live is not a necessity; but to live honorably while
life lasts is a necessity.
150
Mindful of the Stoic's similar attitude towards human dignity,
Kant would not allow his notion of self-sacrifice to be confused
with suicide. Challenging the Stoics' motive for suicide, Kant
argued that true courage in not fearing death ought rather to
compel an individual to preserve that very life which is capable
of triumphing over the most extreme of emotions:
And yet this very courage, this strength of mind - of not fearing
death and of knowing of something which man can prize more highly
than his life - ought to have been an ever so much greater motive for
him not to destroy himself, a being having such authoritative superi-
ority; consequently, it ought to have been a motive for him not to
deprive himself of life.'51
To suffer death in the fulfillment of moral obligation is, in Kant's
view, quite different from committing suicide. In the former
case, death is a consequence of disinterested moral duty; in the
148. Id. at 46.
149. I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 83-84
(Ellington trans. 1964).
150. I. KANT, LEcTuRas ON ETHmCS 152 (L. Infield trans. 1963).
151. Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 149, at 83.
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latter case, death is the very end sought from a motive of per-
sonal interest.
152
The eighteenth century controversy over suicide also touched
on an issue of central importance to the autonomy theorists of
the twentieth century. As supporters of suicide, Montesquieu
and d'Holbach argued that society is founded for mutual advan-
tage, and when there is no longer an advantage for the individual
to remain living in society, society has broken the contract and
the individual is freed from social obligations including any obli-
gations not to commit suicide. 15 Hume added that at times, the
individual's existence is a burden on society, and in such
instances suicide serves the social good.
154
Critics of suicide, like Dumas, Delisle, and Bergier argued that
such evaluations and decisions cannot be made unilaterally. "If
d'Holbach's argument were to be accepted," wrote Bergier, "then
we must conclude that a man has no social duty at all, except
when he finds it to his advantage."'55 As Lester Crocker
observed:
Other harmful consequences to society were pointed out, often repeti-
tiously, by Bergier, Delisle, Dumas, Sabatier de Castres, d'Argens,
Chaudon, Robinet, Du Pont de Nemours, Moore, Hey and Adams and
others. Suicide prevents reparation of injuries and cuts off any fur-
ther good action .... It causes deep sorrow and lasting disgrace to
one's family, and thereby does irreparable harm precisely to those to
whom we owe the most .... Worst of all, approval of suicide would
make each man the judge of his own actions and destroy public order.
It would teach a man not only to die when he pleases, but also to live
as he pleases, since it secures him from all dread of human punish-
ment; thus it would nullify the penal laws. It could logically be
extended to the right of murder: if we may kill ourselves to end our
unhappiness, why may we not dispose of the person who is causing
our unhappiness? We might even kill our family, to spare them the
chagrin of our suicide. In addition, suicide would decimate the
population. 1
56
Such claims struck suicide proponents as inflated. "The repub-
lic," Voltaire laughed, "will do very well without me after my
death, as it did before my birth."57
It is noteworthy, however, that the lines drawn over the ethics
of suicide were not preserved intact in debates about the existing
laws against it. While suicide opponents such as Hutcheson,
Hey, Dumas, Formey and J.B. Merian defended anti-suicide
152. Id. at 84.
153. Crocker, supra note 126, at 63-64.
154. Id. at 64.
155. Id.




laws, suicide proponents like Voltaire and Concorcet were joined
by suicide opponents like Moore and Deliste de Sales in denounc-
ing such laws. The latter group accepted the argument of Bec-
caria that "[p]unishment of a suicide is unjust and tyrannical,
since it affects only an insensible body and innocent people. To
be just or effective, punishment must be personal. The present
law was no more than whipping a statue, and could have little
influence in preventing the crime itself."1
58
The opposition of the English Church to suicide continued
unabated throughout the eighteenth century. Numerous books,
pamphlets and sermons were issued throughout the period in
efforts to stem the recurring epidemic of suicide. 159 The names of
Isaac Watts and John Wesley are especially well known. In
1726, Watts published A Defence Against the Temptation of Self
Murther, 160 in which he saw the main problem with respect to
suicide as the growing atheism of the period. 161 Wesley, in 1790,
called self-murder a "horrid crime," and proposed publicly hang-
ing suicide victims in chains to discourage the practice. 162 Wes-
ley considered the consistent finding of insanity by coroners'
juries to be an abuse of the law.163 In 1772, John Jortion, while
opposing suicide, wrote that the juries on suicide cases were cor-
rect to incline "on the merciful side" because this reduced the suf-
fering of the suicide victim's relatives, and because he did not
believe that God would judge an individual by one action but
rather by the individual's whole life.66 This more lenient ten-
dency eventually became the prevailing view. Hume's writing on
suicide was not generally discussed until after it was published
in the 1783 edition. 165 George Horme, Bishop of Norwich, replied
to Hume's writing in 1784 with Letters on Infidelity, 6 wherein
he attacked Hume's failure to distinguish between natural prin-
ciples and moral ends and blamed suicide partly on the writings
of philosophers. 6 7 One other English product requires mention-
ing due to its comprehensive approach and size. In 1790,
Charles Moore wrote A Full Enquiry into the Subject of Suicide
in two quarto volumes. 16 This work remains one of the most
158. Crocker, supra note 126, at 66.
159. See generally SPRowr, supra note 108, at ch. IV.
160. Id. at 117.
161. Id.
162. J. Wesley, Thought on Suicide, 13 WORKS OF JOHN WESLEY I 320 (1952).
163. Id.
164. SPROTr, supra note 108, at 140.
165. Id. at 143.
166. Id. at 144.
167. Id. at 145.
168. Id. at 152.
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detailed works on suicide in the English language. Within the
work, Moore attacked the Stoics, Donne and Hume.1 9
The Church in America continued the opposition to suicide
although fewer writings from the colonial period evidence this
fact. A clear example of this attitude is found, however, in a ser-
mon by Timothy Dwight entitled, Depravity of Man - It's
Degree .170 Dwight was the grandson of Jonathan Edwards, and
was a member of Edwards' church when Edwards was the pas-
tor. Dwight served in the Continental Army and was also a pas-
tor, professor of Divinity and president of Yale University from
1795-1817. He "did more than any one man in the newborn
United States of America to stem the tide of atheism and
advance the cause of the Christian faith."17' Dwight spoke of sui-
cide as a testimony of "enormous corruption" in his sermon.
172
His statement that it was unnecessary to dwell on the subject
other than to give some statistics indicated a general
consensus. 1
73
VII. SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS
Russell Kirk noted that American political culture draws
deeply from the historical tradition of the West:
[T]he thinking of Americans [at the time of the Revolution] found
their principles of [civil] order in no single political philosopher but
rather in what has been called the "Great Tradition," drawn from
Hebrew and classical and Christian teaching, and tested by the per-
sonal and national experience of their British ancestors and their own
colonial life.
174
American political thought has also been subtly and increasingly
influenced by seventeenth century positivistic currents, and by
the ideas of the eighteenth century statesmen, lawyers,
polemicists and theorists who interpreted, developed or criti-
cized the historical West tradition.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who is said to be the founder of
modern political philosophy, replaced the time-honored idea of
169. SPROTr, supra note 108, at 152-53.
170. III TwENTY CENTURIES OF GREAT PREACHING 203 (1971).
171. Id. at 173.
172. Id. at 203.
173. Id.
174. RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AiERICAN ORDER 292 (1974). See also id. at 14,
20, 23, 25, 29, 48, 58, 73, 84, 94, 106, 403; FREDERICK CoPLEsToN, 4 A HISTORY OF PHILOs-
oPHY 3, 40 (1985); CHARLES GRoVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 52,
54, 57 (1930); FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE AND RIars IN ARIsToTLE's POLITICS
121 (1995); CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 26-27, 36, 39, 74, 79
(1960).
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society as a providentially-ordained covenant governed by love
with the idea of self-interested individuals, protected from one
another through social contract by the sword of an absolute sov-
ereign. 175 While Hobbes' positivistic philosophy 176 was inimical
to the American colonists, his individualist teachings neverthe-
less worked upon the colonies where a strong sentiment of indi-
vidualism prevailed. 177 Indeed, Hobbes' concept of the social
contract among otherwise asocial individuals has now become
common in modern American political discourse. What was Hob-
bes' view of suicide? Although he never discussed the topic
explicitly, Hobbes seemed exclusively concerned with portraying
the fear of a violent death at the hands of others as humanity's
motive passion. 78 Though one modern student of Hobbes'
thought maintained that Hobbes believed a life might be so mis-
erable as not to be worth living, 79 it should be noted that
although life in Hobbes' hypothetical state of nature was quite
wretched, human beings in the natural state nevertheless sought
to preserve their existence.8 0
In Hobbes' theory, the overwhelming natural desire to pre-
serve one's existence became a natural right.' 8 ' The common-
wealth was indeed created and the sovereign endowed with
immense power for the purpose of effecting this right.8 2 There-
fore, the sovereign could not command the self-destruction of any
individual.8 " The natural right to self-preservation remained
175. KIRK, supra note 61, at 271; THONNARD, supra note 34, at 575-78.
176. THoNNARD, supra note 34, at 565-68.
177. KIK, supra note 61, at 270. George Sabine comments on Hobbes' individual-
ism succinctly:
This individualism is the thoroughly modem element in Hobbes, and the respect in
which he caught most clearly the note of the coming age. For two centuries after
him, self-interest seemed to most thinkers a more obvious motive than disinterest-
edness, and the enlightened self-interest a more applicable remedy for social ills
than any form of collective action.
GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 403 (1937). The colonial American
understanding of individualism connoted self-initiative and liberty from government
oppression without eclipsing the sense of obligation to God, family and the community;
however, due to the influence of Hobbes and Locke, the term has become increasingly
associated with the concept of self-interest to the point where, in the name of individual-
ism, natural obligations are practically denied. On this point, Toqueville warned that
individualism "at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks
and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness." ALEXIS DE
TOQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98 (Francis Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds. 1963).
178. L. STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND rrs GENESIS
16-17 (E. Sinclair trans. 1963).
179. Id. at 16.
180. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1947). See also id. at 84, 86-87.
181. Id. at 84.
182. Id. at 109-13. See also id. at 113-20, 129-36.
183. Id. at 142-43.
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vested in each subject. 84 If the subject had any duty in Hobbes'
system, it was a duty to keep his or her covenants and this duty
was intimately connected with a duty to preserve oneself. Hob-
bes stated that, "[j]ustice, that is to say keeping of covenants, is a
rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do anything destruc-
tive to our life; and consequently a law of nature."88
John Locke (1602-1702) was also a philosopher of individual-
ism. In opposition to Hobbes, however, he followed more closely,
at least in a provisional manner, to the natural law tradition of
Hooker and Thomas Aquinas.186 In his Second Treatise of Gov-
ernment, Locke intended to restrain government to the smallest
possible compass lest government interfered with the right to
property. 187 Society, Locke argued, is a product of voluntary con-
tract among men equal in a state of nature.188 Hence, Locke's
philosophy was not accepted in toto by the colonial Americans;
rather, they made selective use of this thinking with respect to
how it supported the God-given right of rebellion against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental powers.8 9 Just as self-inter-
est and utility are now predominant values of the modern Ameri-
can culture, John Locke's teachings are undeniably an important
part of this nation's political consciousness.' 90 Locke consistently
184. Id. at 144-45.
185. HOBBES, supra note 180, at 96. A strong case can be made for the thesis that
Hobbes did not consider self-preservation a duty in the strictest sense. Rather, Hobbes'
rule of reason was merely a prudential maxim counseling self-preservation. See L.
STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 1 (1953).
186. COPLESTON, 4 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Copleston suggests:
Locke had maintained the doctrine of natural rights, that is to say, the natural
rights of individuals, which are not derived from the State and cannot legitimately
be abolished by the State. This theory, which has its antecedents in medieval
thought and which was applied in the American Declaration of Independence, was
influential also on the Continent.
Id. at 40. See also BECKER, supra note 174, at 74.
187. KnuK, supra note 61, at 287.
188. Id. Note that in this connection, in the rough draft of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, Jefferson wrote: "[AIll men are created equal and independent." (emphasis
added). However, the term independent is deleted from the final draft. Evidently the
committee (including, among others, Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin) appointed to pre-
pare the document decided, after careful reflection, against making the claim that man is
crated as an independent creature. They apparently recognized that all men are created
as essentially social creatures and not as isolated atoms. BECKER, supra note 174, at 161;
KIaK, supra note 61, at 48. Accordingly, one can infer that the drafters of the declaration
would consider sociality, and not the "emanation" of privacy, as a fundamental human
right.
189. Knuc, supra note 61, at 291. Kirk noted: 'Te Americans would make use of
Locke, but they would not worship him. In general, American leaders accepted neither
the determinism and absolute sovereignty of Hobbes, nor yet the doctrines of the origins
of society and of the human understanding as put forward by Locke." Id.
190. See B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1965) (noting that
Locke's theories formed the "skeleton" of revolutionary political discourse). See also, L.
34 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 35:7
opposed a right to suicide. Locke's argument against suicide was
intertwined with an essential feature of his political theory; lim-
ited government grounded on the consent of the governed. Locke
derived both the prohibition of suicide and the idea of limited
government from one and the same source, natural law. In
Locke's writings, the limitations on the liberty to dispose of one-
self were closely linked with limitations on the government's
authority to dispose of the individual's affairs.
In an early work entitled Essay on the Law of Nature, Locke
adduced suicide to illustrate the thesis that the law of nature
cannot be known from the general consent of humanity. Locke
proposed that just because suicide has been practiced in and
sanctioned by different societies at different times, this is no
proof that the practice is sanctioned by natural law, for, "if any
law of nature would seem to be established among all as sacred
in the highest of degree ... surely this is self-preservation ....
But in fact, the power of custom and opinion based on traditional
ways of life is such as to arm men even against their own
selves."191
As Locke's philosophy waxed hedonistic, he turned away from
the explication of natural law.192 Nevertheless, Locke's position
against an individual's right to commit suicide remained
unchanged. In Locke's Second Treatise of Government, his argu-
ment against suicide was incorporated with his discussion of the
state of nature, treatment of slavery and theory of circumscribed
governmental power. In Locke's state of nature, individuals
were equal and free. 1 93 Nevertheless, though individuals were in
a state of liberty:
STRAuss, supra note 178 at 165; THE LiFE AND SELECTED WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
719 (A. Koch and W. Peden eds. 1944) (letter from Patterson to Henry Lee).
191. J. LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 173 (W. Von Leyden ed. 1954). In
Locke's view, this was not surprising, for "men have already shown so much ingenuity in
the corruption of morals and such a variety of vices that ... it is impossible to commit any
crime whatsoever of which there has not been an example already." Id. at 165. For
instance:
What is one to believe about duty towards parents if whole nations have been met
with where grown-up offspring kill their parents, where children... take away the
life which the Fates continue to bestow, . . . where no ripe old age ... [is] to be
expected, where each is the executioner of his parent and parricide is considered as
one of the duties of piety.
Id. at 171. Given this, Locke concluded "that if anyone wants to judge moral rectitude by
the standard of such accordance of human actions among themselves, and thence to infer
a law of nature, he is doing no more than if he bestowed his pains on playing the fool
according to reason." Id. at 165.
192. Von Leyden, Introduction to LOCKE, supra note 191 at 60-82. See also L.
STRAuss, supra note 178, at 202-51.
193. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVEm ENT 4-5 (J. W. Gough ed. 1946).
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[I]t is not a state of license, though man in that state [of nature] have
an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or his possessions,
yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature
in his possession but where some nobler use ... calls for it.'
The reason for this was that "men being the workmanship of one
omnipotent... makes all servants of one sovereign master, sent
into the world by his order and about his business - they are his
property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his,
not on another's pleasure."195
Locke reiterated this argument in his chapter on slavery. An
individual could not give himself or herself over into slavery for
the same reason that the individual could not kill himself or her-
self: the individual does not possess that sort of power over his
or her life. Locke stated, "[n]obody can give more power than he
has over himself; and he that cannot take away his own life can-
not give another power over it." 19 In Locke's view, however, an
individual could commit a crime by which his or her life was for-
feited. Such an individual might submit to slavery rather than
face deserved execution. Locke seemed to sanction a form of
indirect suicide for these "slaves." Locke found that "[fior when-
ever [the individual] finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh[s]
the value of his life, it is in his power by resisting the will of his
master to draw on himself the death he desires." 97 This doctrine
appears to be contrary to Locke's general prohibition of suicide
and is regarded as an inconsistency by one Locke scholar. 9 s It
should be kept in mind that Locke believed these "slaves" to have
already forfeited their natural right to life through the commis-
sion of some capital crime, however, and that suicide and slavery
seemed consistently conjoined in Locke's thought.
Locke's anti-suicide argument established a crucial difference
between his political theory and the political theory of Hobbes.
Hobbes developed no explicit argument against suicide. Hobbes
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 14. Tully points out that this "workmanship model' is a fundamental
feature of all Locke's writings." J. TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND
His ADvERsARiEs 4 (1980). See also id. at 35-50. The argument from God as maker was
common in Locke's day. Id. at 41-42. Though Strauss, in a much disputed thesis, argued
that Locke's traditional natural law arguments were merely cautious writing that did not
reflect his own beliefs, the fact that Locke felt compelled to make the argument consist-
ently shows that the ideas behind it were firmly rooted in English political and legal
thought. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 178, at 202-30. Moreover, even if the ground of
Locke's anti-suicide argument were to shift, it does not follow that Locke's position
against suicide would change.
196. LocKE, supra note 193, at 14.
197. Id.




also permitted people to enslave themselves by covenant. 199
From the freedom to enslave oneself, Hobbes deduced the free-
dom to agree to the establishment of an absolute and arbitrary
sovereign power. Locke saw this approach as dangerous and
opposed it as self-defeating; Locke argued that this sort of sover-
eign posed as great a threat to individual security and self-pres-
ervation as the hazards of the state of nature. 2"° Unlike Hobbes,
Locke had recourse to the anti-suicide argument as a reason for
prohibiting the alienation of an individual's liberty and for limit-
ing the power of the sovereign . 2 1 As has been observed, Locke
employed the workmanship argument to show that an individual
has no right to self-slaughter. Locke redeployed this argument
to prove that there is no right to enslave oneself. Finally, Locke
again pressed the argument as a justification for limiting the sov-
ereign power. In Locke's view, civil power was derived from
individual power. The individual power, however, was limited.
It necessarily follows therefore that the grant of the individual's
power to the government was also limited.
[N]obody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself;
and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself ... to
destroy his own life .... A man,.... as has been proved, cannot sub-
ject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state
of nature ... only so much [power] as the law of nature gave him for
the preservation of himself... this is all he doth, or can2give up to the
commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power ....
2
This argument descended from Locke to the American political
tradition through the much less prosaic language of the Declara-
tion of Independence. °3 In the Declaration of Independence, the
maker who proscribes society's self-destruction became a creator
who endows individuals with a right to life which individuals
themselves cannot alienate. While the author of the Declaration
nowhere commented on Locke's anti-suicide argument, Thomas
Jefferson categorically stated that "[t]he care of human life and
199. HOBBES, supra note 180, at 132.
200. LOCKE, supra note 198, at 9.
201. As noted, Hobbes did not employ an anti-suicide argument in any explicit way.
202. LOcE, supra note 198, at 68. See also id. at 73-74. Locke stated:
Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another to take
away his life .... This is a power which neither nature gives, for it has made no
such distinction between one man and another, nor compact can convey; for man,
not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man
such a power over it ....
Id. at 87. For a discussion of the relationship between the rule of law, liberalism, and
judgments about whose lives are worth living, see Sherlock, Liberalism, Public Policy and
the Life Not Worth Living: Abraham Lincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia, 26 Am. J. Juais.
47 (1981).
203. See THE LnE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 190,
at 719.
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happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legiti-
mate object of good government."2 °4 Jefferson offered further
opinions on the problem of suicide in a footnote to a bill that he
drafted for the general reform of Virginia laws. 2 5 The bill, enti-
tled a Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases
heretofore capital, provided that in the case of suicide, "the law
will not add to the miseries of the party by punishments or forfei-
ture."206 Jefferson joined with both proponents and opponents of
suicide in accepting Beccaria's argument against contemporary
anti-suicide laws and elaborated on his objection to these laws
with arguments based on the need for logical consistency in met-
ing out punishments and with arguments based on various prac-
tical considerations:
The suicide injures the state less than he who leaves it with his
effects. If the latter then be not punished, the former should not. As
to example, we need not fear its influence. Men are too much
attached to this life to exhibit frequent instances of depriving them-
selves of it. For if one can be found who can calmly determine to
renounce life, who is so weary of his existence here as rather to make
experiment of what is beyond the grave, can we suppose him, in such
a state of mind, susceptible to influence from the losses to his family
by confiscation? That men in general disapprove of this severity is
apparent from the constant practice of juries finding the suicide in a
state of insanity; because they have no other way of saving the
forfeiture.
20 7
Jefferson opposed forfeiture as a punishment for suicide not
only because he regarded it as draconian to punish the innocent
heirs of the suicide victim, but also because he regarded forfei-
ture as a form of rapacity practiced by the government on the
citizenry. In 1782, Jefferson petitioned the Governor of Virginia
on behalf of a relative and potential heir of a suicide not to
enforce the forfeiture law. He reminded the Governor that the
British Crown, "in mitigation of the rigors of the law," was accus-
tomed to "regrant... such property as had lapsed by the misfor-
tunes of individuals to the families from which the property had
204. Thomas Jefferson, Speech to the Republican Citizens of Washington County,
Maryland (March 31, 1809), reprinted in J. BARTLErr, FAMILiAR QUOTATIONS 472-73 (14th
ed. 1968). It should be noted that Jefferson did not qualify human life as only that which
was meaningful, wanted, or which met some arbitrary criterion of viability.
205. 2 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 496 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1952).
See also id. editorial note, at 305-24.
206. Id. at 496. The purpose of the revision was to temper the severity of the laws,
and to bring them into line with the spirit of moderation regarded as necessary for the
success of republican government. See id. at 492-507. In the preface to the bills, the
"Plan Agreed Upon by the Committee of Revisors at Fredericksburg," suicide is classed
.as a disease." Id. at 325.
207. JEFFERSON, supra note 205, at 496.
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been derived."208 Jefferson then attributed the rigors of the for-
feiture laws to a "spirit of rapine and hostility by princes towards
their subjects."20 9 He advocated that such laws, common in
"barbarous times ... [are] inconsistent with the principles of
moderation and justice which principally endear a republican
government to its citizens."210
This critique of Anglo-Saxon anti-suicide laws is similar to
Montesquieu's criticism of the Roman anti-suicide law under the
first emperors.21' In Montesquieu's view, the Roman law was
simply an outgrowth of the Emperor's avarice, and thus a purely
fiscal measure designed to enrich the Emperor through the con-
fiscation of the suicide victim's property.21 2 Montesquieu felt
that unlike the Greek anti-suicide law based on "fine ideas" and
which had the formation of character as its goal,21 3 the Roman
law had no natural relation to any legitimate public purpose.
Montesquieu suggested that this was also true of English anti-
suicide laws. He believed that in England, suicide was "the
effect of a distemper."214 The English, Montesquieu explained,
"destroy themselves most unaccountably . . .often in the very
bosom of happiness."215 Therefore, "[i]t is evident, that the civil
laws of some countries may have reasons for brandishing suicide
with infamy: But in England it cannot be punished without pun-
ishing the effect of madness." 216 Montesquieu's views on suicide
were actually more subtle than appears from his apparent reduc-
tion of the issue to commentary on national temperaments.
In his Persian Letters, Montesquieu articulated both sides of
the suicide debate in a succession of fictional epistles. In the sev-
enty-sixth letter, an eastern potentate named Usbek who was
visiting Paris complained to a friend that "European laws are
ferocious against those who kill themselves."21 7 Usbek made a
political assault on these laws by arguing that no duty is owed to
society by the individual and, therefore society cannot proscribe
208. 6 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 155 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1952).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See MONTESQUIEU, 1 SPmrr OF LAWS 276 (1802).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 271. At the request of the Sorbonne Faculty of theology, Montesquieu
added a footnote to this chapter in the 1757 edition of THE SPnuT OF LAws: "Suicide is
contrary to the natural law and revealed religion." M. RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF MONTESQuIEU 338 n.ll (1977).
215. See MoNrEsQuuu, supra note 211, at 271.
216. Id. at 217.
217. MONTESQUiEU, THE PERSIAN LETERS 129 (G.R. Healy trans. 1964).
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suicide.21 8 Usbek then attempted to refute the belief that suicide
is a violation of God's Providential order. "What can this mean?"
he asked. "Do I disturb the Providential order when I... make a
ball square, a ball that the first laws of movement.., have made
round? Certainly not, I simply use a right given to me, and in
that sense I can disrupt all of nature as I will . . .2.9 Prohibi-
tions against suicide, Usbek concluded, "have no other source but
our pride."22 °
In the next letter of his Persian Letters, Montesquieu turned
the tables on Usbek. Usbek's friend argued that it was suicide
rather than the laws prohibiting it that stemmed from pride. An
individual's trials in life and his or her impatience with such tri-
als only "show us that we want to be happy independents of Him
who grants all felicity .... 221 Usbek's friend concluded that if
the "necessity of preserving unity [of body and soul] is the best
guarantee of men's actions then it should be made a civil law."22 2
On what side did Montesquieu come down in this dispute?
Letter 104 in Montesquieu's Persian Letters points to a possible
resolution. In this letter, Usbek, the supporter of a suicide right,
criticized Locke's argument for limited, consensual government,
which, as we have seen, rested on Locke's assumption that sui-
cide was illegitimate.2m Usbek implied that Locke's doctrine was
responsible for the instability of English politics and the insubor-
dination of the English people. Thus, with Letter 104, Montes-
quieu affirmed the connection between a liberal constitution and
the belief that the individual's power over his or her own life is
limited. Significantly, Montesquieu linked the desire for abso-
lute rule of the eastern autocrat with the belief in an individual's
freedom to commit suicide.2 24 According to Montesquieu's Usbek,
218. See id. at 130 (noting: "Society is based on mutual advantage; but when the
society becomes onerous to me, who is to prevent my renouncing it .... Will the prince
demand that I remain his subject if I receive no advantages from subjugation?").
219. Id. at 130.
220. Id. at 130-31.
221. Id. at 131.
222. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 217, at 131.
223. Id. at 173. As the writer notes:
But if a prince, instead of making his subjects happy, tries to oppress and destroy
them, the obligation of obedience ceases .... They [British subjects] maintain that
no absolute power can be legitimate because it could never have had a legitimate
origin. For we cannot, they say, give to another more power over us than we have
ourselves. Now we have not absolute power over ourselves; for example, we cannot
take our own lives. Therefore, they conclude, no one on earth has such power.
Id. Usbek regarded this argument as sophistical and self-serving. He, himself, employed
an argument based on the idea that political obligation bind only insofar as it is advanta-
geous. Unlike Locke, Usbek employed this rhetoric on behalf of a suicide right. See id. at
129.
224. Id. at 173.
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the real cause of English political unrest could be found in "the
impatient temper of the English."225 Of course, this is consistent
with Montesquieu's English suicide theory in Spirit of Laws.
The works of Jean Jacques Rousseau were not unknown in
America. In fact, Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle Heloise received
some attention from both American statesmen and the American
public.226 The novel, written in the form of a series of letters, is
pertinent because like Montesquieu's book it contains two letters
debating the validity of suicide.227 In one of the letters, Rous-
seau's Werther-like Saint Preux wrote, among other arguments,
a classic apology for suicide based on individual autonomy and
the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding con-
duct.21 The response to this argument came from Rousseau's
character called Lord Bomston, who Rousseau employed not only
to argue against suicide229 but also to contradict Montesquieu's
theory about the suicidal English temper. Bomston replied to
Saint Preux's argument by stating: "I have a firm soul; I am
English." He also stated: "I know how to die, for I know how to
live and suffer .... 23
An examination of Rousseau's political works indicates that he
opposed suicide. In an attempt to restore some civic virtue to the
modern liberal state, Rousseau grafted the duty-based anti-sui-
cide arguments of the ancients onto the Lockean arguments. In
Rousseau's Social Contract, he asked "how individuals who have
no right to dispose of their own lives can transmit to the Sover-
eign this right which they do not possess."231 Rousseau claimed
225. Id.
226. See P. SpuRmINE, ROUSSEAU IN AMERICA, 47-56 (1969). Both John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson read the novel. Id. at 50-51, 55-56. John Adams made notes in the
margins of his copy of the novel, cryptically commenting on the relative merits of Saint-
Preux' arguments on behalf of suicide. Saint-Preux contended that the Lockean argu-
ment "that God has placed us in this world and therefore we have no right to leave it
without permission," is false because God "has placed us also in our city and yet we need
no permission to leave that." "Excellent sophistry," Adams commented, "If the word
excellent may be used."
Saint-Preux also argued that "once the weariness of life conquers the horror of
death ... life becomes intolerable." Adams thought that this argument was "rather bet-
ter." See Z. HARAszrrrr, JOHN ADAMS AND THE PROPHETS OF PROGRESS 97 (1964).
227. J. ROUSSEAU, LA NoUvELLE HELOISE 263-65 (J.H. McDowell trans. 1968).
228. Id. at 264.
229. Id. at 265.
230. Id.
231. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SocIAL CONTRACT 53 (C. Cheroover ed. and trans. 1974). See
also ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN
168 (D. Masters ed., R.D. Masters and J.R. Masters trans. 1964). In the Second Discourse
Rousseau repeated his variation on Locke's theme:
[Als the right of property is only conventional ... every man can dispose at will of
what he possesses. But it is not the same for essential gifts of nature, such as life
and freedom, which everyone is permitted to enjoy and of which it is at least doubt-
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that suicide is a "crime"123 primarily because the suicide victim
shirks the duty he or she owes to the state. Rousseau was obvi-
ously not persuaded by the argument summed up in Voltaire's
sarcastic comment that the republic would do very well without
him,2 3 for Rousseau asserted that "[tihere is no man so worth-
less that he cannot be made good for something."
234
In his Second Discourse,2  Rousseau condemned suicide as
one of the many evils attendant on civil society. Rousseau
stated: "I ask if anyone has ever heard it said that a savage in
freedom even dreamed of complaining about life and killing him-
self. Let it then be judged with less pride on which side [civil
society or the state of nature] true misery lies." 236 Rousseau
developed a theme prominent in his works in Second Discourse,
which is the distinction between the pride (amour propre) that
drove humanity to its present state of woe and amour de sol, the
natural and salutary instinct that urges an individual in the
state of nature to preserve himself or herself.2 7 For Rousseau,
suicide was a bitter fruit of civil society that grew out of the evil
of human pride. Therefore, Rousseau regarded suicide as an
unnatural outgrowth of pride.
Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was a partisan of both America's
Lockean and France's Rousseauist revolutions.238 Paine com-
posed a theme on suicide in the form of a letter to Lady Smyth,
who had written Paine while he was in a prison in Luxem-
bourg.239 Paine shared the common conviction that suicide is
contrary to reason. Paine stated, "[h]ow dismal must the picture
of life appear to the mind in that dreadful moment, when it
resolves on darkness, and to die! One can scarcely believe such a
choice possible."240 Significantly, this ardent opponent of tyr-
ful that one has the right to divest himself; by giving up the one, one degrades his
being, by giving up the other one destroys it... and as no temporal goods can
compensate for the one or the other, it would offend both nature and reason to
renounce them whatever the price..
Id. at 167. In EmE, Rousseau says that "man's freedom, while it may appear to be
unlimited, extends only as far as his natural forces, which are defined by the hard law of
necessity and violated only at man's peril." R. MAsTERs, Tim POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
ROUSSEAU 319 (1968) (paraphrasing EMILE, II).
232. ROUSSEAU, TiE SocIAL CONTRAcT, supra note 231, at 53.
233. See generally id.
234. Id. at 57.
235. ROUSSEAU, THE SECOND DIscouRsE, supra, note 231, at 127.
236. Id.
237. See MAmSRs, supra note 231, at 39-40. See also STRAUSS, supra note 178, at
270-71.
238. Paine denounced the later excesses of the French Revolution. See 2 T. PAINE,
CoMPLETE WRrriNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 1124 (P. Foner ed. 1969).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1121.
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anny compared the "necromantic nightmare" that seizes a sui-
cide's mind with tyranny.
241
Paine insinuated that the instinct of self-preservation is strong
not because death is so terrible, but because life is, or can be,
sweet. Paine captured the optimism about life that was charac-
teristic of the new democratic age.242 He observed that "[iut is
often difficult to know what is misfortune."24 Further, Paine
noted, "[that which we feel is a great one today may be the
means of turning aside our steps into some new path that leads
to happiness yet unknown."24 Paine believed that even though
individuals cannot know what the future holds, life is the only
rational choice to make regarding the future. Paine concluded
his letter to Lady Smyth noting his expectation that his own past
disappointments, now transformed into a "condition which is
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